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Abstract—Field failures, that is, failures caused by faults
that escape the testing phase leading to failures in the field,
are unavoidable. Improving verification and validation activities
before deployment can identify and timely remove many but not
all faults, and users may still experience a number of annoying
problems while using their software systems.
This paper investigates the nature of field failures, to under-
stand to what extent further improving in-house verification and
validation activities can reduce the number of failures in the field,
and frames the need of new approaches that operate in the field.
We report the results of the analysis of the bug reports of five
applications belonging to three different ecosystems, propose a
taxonomy of field failures, and discuss the reasons why failures
belonging to the identified classes cannot be detected at design
time but shall be addressed at runtime. We observe that many
faults (70%) are intrinsically hard to detect at design-time
Index Terms—field faults, field failures, field testing, field-
intrinsic faults, failure context, software testing
I. INTRODUCTION
Software field failures are failures that occur in the field with
sometimes severe consequences on users and organizations,
such as customer dissatisfaction, economic losses and legal
issues. Field failures are caused by faults that escape the
in-house testing activities and are not detected and repaired
before the software is released in the field. We denote such
faults as field faults.
Field failures may depend on weak testing activities and
poor development practices. However, they may also derive
from factors that prevent the failures to be detected and the
corresponding faults to be removed before the software is
released, such as when the conditions that trigger the failure
are impossible to reproduce in the testing environment and
when the number of combinations to be executed goes beyond
any reasonable limit.
An example of conditions impossible to reproduce in-house
is the extraordinary system load that derives from millions of
people connected over the Internet to watch an exceptional
sport event like the final match of the European Champions
League or the US Super Bowl streamings [1]. It is impossible
to reproduce the same environment conditions to accurately
test the system in-house for revealing the uncovered and
failure-prone behaviors that may occur in the field, as it
happened in 2016 when the CBS app failed to stream the
Super Bowl match to several customers [2].
An example of amount of combinations impractical to
execute with in-house testing is the extraordinary cardinality
of the Microsoft environment configurations [3] that reaches
trillion of combinations of the configuration parameters.
Field faults that cannot be detected with in-house testing
approaches might be more easily addressable in the field where
the diversity and complexity of the execution environment
could be exploited in the verification activity. Field faults
have attracted the interest of both academia, mainly in the
context of service-based [4], [5] and caching systems [3], and
industry, with approaches like Netflix that injects faults in the
production systems to validate scenarios that are impossible
to test in-house [6].
Studies of field faults have considered many aspects, such as
fault distribution [7], [8], fault locality [7], fault locations [9],
activities and types of human errors that introduce faults [10],
relations between fault types, failure detection and failure
severity [11], and evolution of faults during bug fixing [12].
Despite the growing interest in field faults and the design of
approaches to address different kinds of faults, there is still no
study on the nature of field problems that indicates whether
they can be better addressed in-house by improving testing
techniques and methodologies, or in the field by exploiting the
many instances of a same application running within several
heterogeneous environments.
In this paper we present a study which provides an initial
characterization of field faults and the consequent failures
in the field: (i) we introduce a set of characteristics that
make faults hardly detectable in-house, (ii) we study the
characteristics of failures reported by the users from three
ecosystems, and (iii) we discuss the factors that make these
failures likely observable only in the field. Our results indicate
that:
• 70% of the problems observed in the field are extremely hard
if not impossible to detect with in-house testing approaches,
and are potentially easy to detect in the field;
• 78% of the problems that are hard to detect in house can
be observed only in the presence of resources available
in the field, for example new plugins, files and network
connections, further emphasizing the role of the field to
reveal these problems.
These results corroborate the intuition that we need more in-
field software verification approaches that exploit the resources
available in the field to complement classic in-house V&V
strategies.
The analysis is based on bug reports from three ecosystems
- Eclipse, OpenOffice and Nuxeo - and gives initial evidence
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of the predominance of field faults that can be hardly revealed
in-house. The results of our analysis are publicly available at
http://www.lta.disco.unimib.it/tools/field/.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II proposes a
taxonomy of field failures. Sections III and IV present the
research questions that we investigated and the Ecosystems
considered in our study, respectively. Section V discusses the
empirical procedure we followed to investigate the research
questions. Section VI presents the results of our study about
the nature and diffusion of field failures. Section VII discusses
the main findings, Section VIII presents related work, and
Section IX summarizes the results presented in the paper.
II. FIELD FAILURES
In this section, we introduce the key concepts that are
relevant in our study: field failure, field fault and field-intrinsic
fault.
Field Failure: A field failure is a software failure experi-
enced in a production environment.
Field Fault: A field fault is a fault that is present in
a software program deployed and running in a production
environment.
Field faults may or may not cause field failures, depending
on the execution conditions in the field.
In-house Faults and Failures: The term in-house refers
to the development environment. In-house failures indicate
failures that occur when testing the software system in the
development environment and in-house faults indicate the
causes of the failures exposed during testing.
The distinction between field and in-house failures depends
only on the time the failures are exposed and not on the
nature of the fault. The same failures may be field failures if
occurring in the field and in-house failures if revealed during
testing. We differentiate faults by their nature by introducing
the new concept of field-intrinsic faults and the corresponding
taxonomy.
Field faults might be either faults that simply escape the
testing phase as a consequence of an inaccurate testing pro-
cess, or problems that are hard or sometime even impossible
to reveal in-house before the software is executed in the field.
Distinguishing between these two classes of field-faults is
extremely important, because they call for different methods
and techniques to be effectively addressed. Faults that simply
escape the testing phase as a consequence of an inaccurate
testing process can be addressed by improving the in-house
testing and analysis activities, while faults that are hard
or sometime even impossible to reveal in-house should be
addressed with methods that operate in the field.
The empirical data reported in this paper indicate three
main categories of factors that harden detecting software
faults in-house: faults impossible to activate in-house, faults
that depend on unknown conditions, and faults that depend
on ”uncountable” many configurations. Faults impossible to
activate in-house are faults that depend on conditions that
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Fig. 1. General production environment
cannot be simulated in laboratory. Faults that depend on
unknown conditions are faults that are activated by undocu-
mented situations which cannot be thus identified with any
systematic approach. Faults that depend on ”uncountable”
many inputs and conditions are faults characterized by an input
and configuration spaces so large that cannot be effectively
addressed in-house either exhaustively or selectively. For ex-
ample the huge heterogeneity of unique devices, operating
systems, apps versions and configurations that characterize
the mobile phone market cannot be tested exhaustively and
do not present similarities that support any effective selective
approach, that is, faults may be revealed in-house by chance,
but would escape any feasible testing campaign no matter how
effectively designed.
Distinguishing between faults that survive the testing due
to inadequate quality processes and faults that are inherently
hard to detect no matter if because impossible to activate or
depending on unknown or uncountable execution conditions
is important to devise verification and validation strategies.
Witnessing the presence and quantity of the different classes
of faults is important to define suitable V&V campaigns. We
start the study and capture the different nature of faults with
the new concept of field-intrinsic faults that we experimentally
investigate in detail in the rest of this paper.
Field-intrinsic Fault: A field-intrinsic fault is a field fault
that is inherently hard to detect in-house, either because impos-
sible to activate in-house or because depending on unknown
or ”uncountable” many conditions.
Although some field-intrinsic faults can be revealed and
removed in-house by chance, most field-intrinsic faults escape
any reasonable pre-deployment V&V activity and manifest
only in the field. In the reminder of this paper we characterize
and classify field-intrinsic faults and support the need of new
field V&V activities. We report the results of an empirical
study of a body of field faults that we found in the fault
repositories of different applications aiming to analyze the
distribution of field-intrinsic faults in production environments.
Figure 1 shows the different elements that comprise a
production environment and that play a key role in field-
intrinsic faults. The software in the field (SIF) represents
a software application or a software system running in the
field. The SIF receives inputs and produces outputs. The SIF
receives the inputs in the form of data and stimuli from both
the SIF users and other systems interacting with the SIF.
The SIF outputs might be either visualized for the users or
dispatched to other systems. While executing, the SIF may
interact with a field that includes several entities that are not
under the control of the SIF: multiple types of resources, such
as files and databases, which might be accessed by the SIF
during computations, and third-party components that provide
services to the SIF, such as plugins that extend the capabilities
of the SIF with additional features, drivers & services that
provide a range of services to the SIF, and the operating system
that defines the basic runtime environment of the SIF. Finally,
the SIF may communicate with other applications and services
using the network.
The role of the environment in field failures leads to the
concept of failure context:
Failure Context: A failure context is the execution context
of a failure, that is, the specific state that the elements in the
field must have to trigger the failure.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We studied the nature and distribution of field failures by
analyzing a set of bug reports produced by the end-users of
three ecosystems, and we articulated the roadmap of our study
in terms of four research questions.
RQ1: Why are faults not detected at testing time?
We analyzed the field failures in the subject studies to
identify the main factors that determine the faults to survive
after testing and continue to exist in the field.
RQ2: Which elements of the field are involved in field
failures?
We analyzed the dependencies of field failures on the field
itself, to identify which elements of the field are involved in
the failures.
RQ3: What kinds of field failures can be observed?
We clustered the field failures reported in the subject studies
into classes, and identified some relevant types according to
their impact and detectability.
RQ4: How many steps are needed to reproduce a field
failure?
We estimated the least subset of steps required to reproduce
the field failures. We identify steps as user actions, being the
subject studies reactive GUI applications.
IV. STUDY SUBJECTS
We selected a set of desktop and web applications that (i)
are available with the source code, (ii) are widely adopted
and are thus good representatives of well used applications,
and (iii) give access to publicly available bug reports, which
are needed to study bug reports submitted by end-users. We
thus selected multiple applications from three ecosystems:
Eclipse and in particular its well-known and widely used
plugins: the Subversive SVN client for Eclipse [13], the EGit
Eclipse Team provider for Git [14] and the EclipseLink plugin
for developing code using the Java persistence API [15].
The bug reports are accessible on the Eclipse Bugzilla bug
tracking system [16].
OpenOffice is one of the most popular open source office
applications [17]. The bug reports are accessible on the
Apache OpenOffice Bugzilla bug tracking system [18].
Nuxeo is a Web-based content management system used to
develop many popular Web sites [19]. The Nuxeo issue
tracking is Jira [20].
V. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
For our analysis, we identified as faults the bugs labeled as
confirmed, verified or resolved, and we inspected all the bugs
reported for the three Eclipse plugins from January 2015 to
December 2015 for a total of 412 analyzed bug reports, and
all the bugs reported for both OpenOffice and Nuxeo from
September 1st 2016 to October 1st 2016, for a total of 99 and
56 bug reports inspected, respectively.
For each bug report, we inspected the information about the
failure, the inputs, the execution conditions and the failure im-
pact. We discarded the bug reports containing only a memory
dump and a stack trace, which might be useful for developers,
but are not useful for the purpose of our investigation, and
studied in detail a total of 119 bug reports: 63 for Eclipse, 26
for OpenOffice, and 30 for Nuxeo.
RQ1: Why are faults not detected at testing time?
We investigated why faults have not been revealed in house
but have been detected only in the field by examining the
conditions that caused the failures to identify the factors that
contribute to the failures and are extremely hard to be tested
in-house. We labeled each fault as bad-testing, if we could not
find any of such factors, field-intrinsic otherwise. We identified
four categories of field-intrinsic faults that we discuss in the
next section, where we characterize the identified classes of
faults, and we report both qualitative and quantitative data.
We used only the faults labeled as field-intrinsic to answer the
other three research questions.
RQ2: Which elements of the field are involved in field
failures?
For each bug report, we identified the elements of the field
shown in Figure 1 that play an essential role in the failure.
RQ3: What kinds of field failures can be observed?
We studied the characteristics of field failures to identify
their attributes and classify them. Better understanding the
nature of field failures is essential for developing techniques
for testing applications in the field without uncontrolled side
effects. Some types of failures might be easier to detect
and control than others. For example, exception and error
messages are easy to detect and usually do not cause loss of
data because the application itself detects and handles these
erroneous situations; system crashes are also easy to detect,
but may cause loss of user data; incorrect results may be hard
to detect, and may silently compromise the user data and the
overall computation.
We carefully analyzed the failure taxonomies proposed by
Bondavali and Simoncini [21], Aysan et al. [22], Avizienis et
TABLE I
FAILURE TYPES
Value Failures
Invalid value The SIF produces an incorrect output value, al-
though still in the domain of the output variable
Out of domain The SIF produces a value outside the domain of
the output variable
Error message The SIF produces an error message
Timing Failures
Early timing The SIF produces an output too early, for instance
before an expected waiting time
Late timing The SIF produces a value after a required deadline,
defined either explicitly or implicitly
Omission The SIF never produces an output value in an
asynchronous computation
System Failures
Halting failure The SIF never produces any output value in a
synchronous computation
Crash The SIF crashes and no services is delivered
Unstable behavior The SIF shows an erratic behavior without receiv-
ing any input, for instance, a flashing blacklight in
a smartphone
al. [23], Chillarege et al. [24], and Cinque et al. [25] to identify
the candidate attributes for field failures, and exhaustively
inspected the bug reports in our data set to identify the most
relevant attributes for characterising field failures: failure type
and detectability.
Failure Type The failure type characterizes a failure accord-
ing to the way it appears to an observer external to the system.
We identified three possible categories of failure types,
value, timing and system failures, and we further detailed each
type in three subtypes, for a total of nine failure types, which
we use in the next sections to categorize bug reports, and
which are summarised in Table I.
Value failures occur when the SIF produces incorrect out-
puts: an invalid value, a value out of domain or an error
message. For example in a functionality that returns the ZIP
code of a city, a value failure of type invalid value occurs
when the SIF returns the ZIP code associated with a city
different than the input one, a value failure of type out of
domain occurs when the SIF returns a malformed ZIP code,
a value failure of type error message occurs when the SIF
returns a message the reports an internal error that prevented
retrieving a ZIP code.
Timing failures occur when the SIF produces some outputs
at a wrong time: too early (early timing), too late (late timing)
or never (omission).
System failures occur when the SIF is blocked (halting fail-
ure) has stopped running (crash) or does not respond reliably
to the input stimuli (unstable behavior).
Detectability The detectability attribute characterizes the
difficulty of detecting the failure.
We distinguish four levels of detectability, signaled, un-
handled, silent and self-healed, based on both the ability of
the system to detect the failure and an external observer to
TABLE II
FAILURE DETECTABILITY
User SIF
Signaled
√ √
Unhandled
√ ×
Silent × ×
Self-healed × √
LEGEND::√
detected by
× NOT detected by
observe a misbehavior without specific system knowledge, as
summarized in Table II.
Signaled failure: a failure that the system detects and reports.
A simple example of a signaled failure is an application that
opens a popup window to inform the user that the application
will be unexpectedly closed because of a memory problem;
Unhandled failure: a failure that the system does not handle
and that leads to a crash. The system does not detect the
failure, while the user trivially detects the uncontrolled crash
of the application without requiring any knowledge about the
application;
Silent failure: a failure that the system does not detect letting
the application continue operating without producing any
signal that a user can recognize as a failure without prior
knowledge about the application. A simple example of silent
failure is a flight simulator that simulates the flight conditions
imprecisely and that a user cannot detect without a specific
knowledge of the flight simulation system.
Self-healed failure: a failure that the system detects and
overcomes transparently to the user. The user continues using
the application without noticing any problem. Self-healed
failures are common in systems exploiting redundancy to
mask failures, such as Hadoop [26].
RQ4: How many steps are needed to reproduce a field
failure?
For each failure, we identified a sequence of steps that are
needed to cause the failure, aiming to, but not necessarily
proved to be, a minimal sequence. For the interactive subjects,
we identify steps with GUI actions like opening windows,
entering data in some fields, clicking on menus and buttons.
We counted the steps that lead to a failure by considering the
sequence of operations described in the bug reports submitted
by users. When creating a bug report, users intuitively identify
a critical state that may lead to the failure and submit both the
information about the critical status, typically described in a
declarative way, and a sequence of operations that lead to a
system failure from the critical state, typically described in an
operational way. For example in the Open Office bug report
#126930, the state to trigger the failure is characterized by
the availability of a certain file, and the steps to reproduce
the failure consist of opening the file, scrolling the document,
selecting a frame, and enlarging the frame. We identified the
minimal subset of the actions reported by the user that are
needed to cause the failure from the critical state indicated in
the bug report, which often corresponds to the minimal number
of actions needed to reproduce the failure [27].
The amount of steps needed to reproduce a failure is
an important information for estimating the complexity of
testing techniques that work in the field and reveal failures
by monitoring the status of the application to detect failure-
prone states and executing test cases of appropriate complexity
when a failure prone state is detected.
VI. RESULTS
RQ1: Why are faults not detected at testing time?
We analyzed the bug reports to distinguish faults that
are due to insufficient testing (bad testing (BT)) from field-
intrinsic faults. We further analyzed the field-intrinsic faults
and identified four types of conditions that lead to field-
intrinsic faults and that we use to classify such faults: Irre-
producible Execution Condition (IEC), Unknown Application
Condition (UAC), Unknown Environment Condition (UEC),
and Combinatorial Explosion (CE). The identified classes of
faults comprise a complete taxonomy for the faults in the
bug reports that we analyzed, and represent an initial general
framework for classifying field faults.
Irreproducible Execution Condition (IEC) Faults: IEC
faults are faults that can be revealed only under conditions
that cannot be created in-house. This may depend on the
impossibility of reproducing the complexity of the whole field
environment, the inability of creating the specific failing exe-
cution or the evolution of the environment and the interactions
with the SIF.
The safety critical routines to be executed in the case of
natural disasters are good examples of execution conditions
that might be impossible to reproduce in-house. Although a
disaster can be simulated to some extent, a major natural
disaster, for instance an earthquake or a tsunami, cannot be
fully reproduced in-house, and some field-intrinsic faults may
depend on extraordinary combinations of events that can be
observed only in real conditions.
Similarly, the behavior of a system for an increasing num-
ber of users who interact with the application according to
patterns that are not entirely predictable is often hard to test,
especially for extreme situations, such as the extraordinary
online streaming services workload experienced in the Super
Bowl night [2].
The evolving varieties of configurations, for instance ver-
sions of the operating systems, drivers and plugins, are good
examples of unpredictable changes to interactions between
the SIF and the environment (hereafter SIF-environment in-
teractions). New versions or entirely new plugins or drivers
distributed after the most recent SIF release might generate
faults impossible to reveal in-house before the release itself.
An example of such situation is the fault described in the
EclipseLink bug report #429992. EclipseLink is an Eclipse
plugin for developing Java applications that uses JPA to
map objects into databases. The bug report indicates that
EclipseLink silently ignores classes that contain lambda ex-
pressions: even if an object should be persisted in the database
because its class includes the @Entity annotation, no table
for persisting the object is generated in the database. Since
lambda expressions have been introduced only in Java 8, it was
impossible to test the combination of lambda expressions with
JPA annotations when the EclipseLink plugin was developed,
before the release of Java 8. EclipseLink should not have been
affected by the presence of lambda expressions and should
have supported the persistency of the classes regardless of the
presence of lambda expressions. However due to an unforeseen
compatibility issue, EclipseLink stopped working correctly
when processing classes with lambda expressions.
Unknown Application Condition (UAC) Faults: UAC faults
are faults that can be revealed only with input sequences that
although executable in-house depend on conditions about the
application that are ignored before the field execution and thus
cannot be captured in in-house test suites.
An example of field failures that derive from unknown
conditions is the Eclipse Subversive report #459010, which
indicates that Subversive fails when retrieving folders whose
name terminates with a blank character. This corner case is not
documented in the specifications, and is hard to reveal with
in-house testing because of the lack of information that may
suggest to design test cases covering this specific situation.
Structural test suites do not address this problem either, since
many problems of this type are due to missed code, as in the
case of this fault.
Another example of a UAC fault is the Eclipse
#440413 bug report, which describes a fault in
method convertObjectToString of class
XMLConversionManager that converts any object to
a proper string representation. The method works properly
except when used to convert a BigDecimal representing
a number in scientific notation, since it returns a string that
encodes a number in scientific notation and not a plain number
as expected. We verified that this case is not mentioned either
in the XMLConversionManager specification or in the
API documentation, and is thus hidden to the testers who did
not reveal the bug during testing and discovered it in the field
after the software has been released.
In our experimental analysis, we did not have always access
to the specification of the software. When this happened,
we classified a fault as UAC when the inputs that lead to
the failure are largely unrelated with the purpose of the
functionality that fails, assuming that such cases were not
defined in the specifications. Thus our classification may not
be perfectly accurate.
Unknown Environment Condition (UEC) Faults: UEC faults
are faults that can be revealed only with information about the
environment that is not available before field execution. UEC
faults are hardly detectable with in-house test cases designed
without a complete description of the constraints on the SIF-
environment interactions.
The full range of behaviors of third-party services that
the SIF accesses through the network is a good example of
information rarely completely available at design time, and
thus possible source of UEC faults. An example of UEC
fault is the Eclipse bug report #394400 that indicates that
EclipseLink may fail with a NullPointerException
when executed under heavy load on the Oracle JRockit VM.
The issue depends on the behavior of the Just In Time
compilation feature of the JRockit VM that may reorder the
operations executed within method isOverriddenEvent
so that it returns an incomplete result. This undocumented
behavior is responsible for the EclipseLink exception.
Combinatorial Explosion (CE) Faults: Even when the be-
havior of both the application and the environment are fully
specified and can be replicated in-house, the combination
of the cases to be tested may increase to a magnitude of
cases that cannot be fully tested in-house. There are many
sources of combinatorial explosion in software applications,
such as the many possible configurations and preferences, the
combinations of inputs and states, the many environments, for
instance operative systems and hardware devices, that can be
used to run an application, and so on. A well known example
of combinatorial explosion of combinations are the sets of
hardware devices, operating systems and configurations that
comprise the execution conditions of smartphone applications
that can almost never be fully tested in-house.
An example of a CE fault is the fault described in the
Eclipse bug report #484494, which indicates that the diff fea-
ture of the Subversive plugin does not work when comparing
a file to a symlink of a file that has been moved. Changing the
location of a file referred by a symlink and using the symlink
as part of a comparison is a legal combination of operations
among the huge set of combinations that comprise to the
sequence: 〈change the status of a resource, use the changed
resource as part of a computation〉. Systematically testing all
these combinations commonly exceed any reasonable albeit
impressively large testing budget, because of the many ways
resources can be changed independently from each other.
In our analysis, we observed that only a small percentage of
CE cases are due to specific inputs (18% of the cases), while
the rest of the CE cases are due to field elements.
Bad Testing (BT) Faults: We conclude our taxonomy with a
discussion of BT faults, which we classify in our experimental
analysis as field but not field-intrinsic faults. BT faults are
faults that are not detected in-house due to weaknesses of the
testing process. We include in this class all the faults in the
field that do not belong to any of the previously described
classes.
An example of BT fault is the fault reported in the Sub-
versive bug report #326694, which indicates that Subversive
erroneously reports as conflicting two identical files that
have accumulated the same set of changes on two different
branches. Since detecting conflicts is a primary feature of this
plugin, developers should have tested a basic case like the
presence of the same changes in two distinct branches.
Taxonomy: The taxonomy that we proposed in this paper
opens new scenarios of increasing complexity. BT faults
simply substantiate the need of improving the in-house testing
process and do not introduce new challenges for the software
testing community. UAC, UEC and CE faults call for new
techniques to enrich well designed test suites with test cases
identified in the field while experiencing faults caused by
unpredictable (UAC and UEC) or impossible-to-exhaustively-
test (CE) conditions. The main challenge that has been only
partially addressed so far is to record execution sequences that
Fig. 2. RQ1: Why are faults not detected at testing time?
lead to failures in the field, and reproduce them either in the
field or in house to identify and remove the faults. Being not
executable in house, IEC faults further challenge the software
testing community with the problem of executing failing test
cases in the field. The main challenges are to both reveal
failures by executing test cases in the field, which requires to
control the execution of the test cases in the usually complex
field context, and prevent any side-effect for the users.
Quantitative analysis: Figure 2 summarizes the quantitative
results of our empirical investigation. The bar chart indicates
the number of faults classified in the five categories discussed
above, and shows that field-intrinsic faults (the sum of the
IEC, UAC, UEC and CE columns) are the majority of the
field faults in our data set. Field-intrinsic faults represent 70%
of the analyzed bug reports, thus confirming that field faults
cannot be addressed by simply enhancing the testing process,
but calls for specific in-field approaches.
The bar chart indicates that combinatorial explosion (CE)
is the most frequent cause of field-intrinsic faults, while
Irreproducible Execution Condition (IEC) is the least common
source of faults. Unknown execution conditions of either the
application or the environment (UAC and UEC faults) are
also relatively frequent cases. The dominance of CE faults
is not surprising: The behavior of SIFs is influenced by many
factors that can be never exhaustively tested in house. The
many combinations that are hard to design, foresee and test
in house, can be order of magnitudes easier to address in the
field, where such a diversity is spontaneously and implicitly
available.
Our analysis identified few Irreproducible Execution Con-
dition (IEC) faults, all caused by evolution of the SIF-
environment interactions that emerged after the deployment
of plugins not available at the time of testing, before the
deployment of the SIF in the field. The scarce presence of IEC
faults may depend on the nature of the applications that we
analyzed. In other domains the presence of IEC faults might
be higher. Consider for instance the domain of embedded
software, where the interactions with the physical world might
be sometime extremely hard to test. We observed a similar
trend for the three subjects: a predominance of CE faults
(openoffice being the highest at 73%) and a total of 10 - 20 %
faults falling into the UEC/UAC category. It is worth noting
that the two IEC faults we identified were both on the Eclipse
platform.
RQ2: Which elements of the field are involved in field failures?
We analyzed the bug reports to study the role of field
elements in field failures, and validate the intuitive hypothesis
that many field-intrinsic faults may be hard to reveal in-house
because their activation may depend on one or more elements
that should be present in the field and should be in the right
status to produce the failure. Below, we discuss the role played
by the field elements that we introduced in Figure 1, provide
concrete examples, and discuss the quantitative data from the
experimental data sets.
a) Resources: Software applications typically interact
with many resources during the computation. For instance,
many applications read from and write to persistent units, such
as files and databases. Causes of field failures may involve
resources in many ways. In our investigation, we observed two
main cases: interactions between SIF and resources (hereafter
SIF-resource interactions) that lead to performance problems
and SIF-resource interactions leading to functional problems.
The unbearable amount of time for SIFs to process some
large resources and SIFs incorrectly handling resources of a
particular type are examples of performance and functional
problems triggered by SIF-resource interactions, respectively.
An example of SIF-resource interaction that triggers a per-
formance problem is described in the OpenOffice bug report
#95974. The OpenOffice writer crashes when trying to open
a .odt document longer than 375 pages. The failure causes
the CPU usage and the disk access rate to increase to 100%,
and the application window simply crashes after one minute
of unresponsiveness, activating the recovery wizard.
b) Plugins: The plugin mechanism is a common solution
to extend applications with new functionality in the field. In the
presence of plugins, applications work as operating systems
that embed the plugin executions, and interact with the plugins
to access specific functionalities. Applications and plugins are
developed and maintained independently. Evolution at either
sides may trigger failures due to unforeseen interactions.
For example, the EGit bug report #383376 indicates that the
repository search does not work on Github due to an unfore-
seen interaction with the Mylin Github connector plugin.
c) Operating system: Many applications can be executed
on different versions of different operating systems. The
interactions of a SIF with a specific version of an operating
system may trigger failures otherwise unexperienced.
An example of a problem involving the operating system is
the failure documented in the OpenOffice bug report #126622
that describes how the OpenOffice writer does not correctly
handle functionalities involving tables and queries under OSX.
The failure prevents OpenOffice from closing, and forces the
users to restart the operating system.
d) Drivers and services: Applications often interact with
third party drivers and services, whose availability depend
on the production environment. During in-house development
specific combinations might remain untested and failures un-
revealed.
For example, the fault documented in the Eclipse Egit bug
report #435866 indicates that the Eclipse Egit version control
Fig. 3. RQ2: field elements involved in the failure
system fails to open the required network connections due
to some unexpected changes of the authentication methods
implemented in the Eclipse connection service.
e) Network: Many software applications use the network
to access resources or functionalities that are not available lo-
cally. With a plethora of different network protocols available,
failures might be triggered when an application uses a specific
protocol.
For instance, the fault described in the Nuxeo bug report
#20481 describes a failure caused by a connection timeout
that occurs when users download big zip files. Nuxeo does
not handle connection timeouts properly and does not clean
up temporary files, which leads to resources exhaustion.
f) None: In a few cases the field-intrinsic faults do not
depend on any interaction between the field elements and the
SIF. Although not depending on any field element, these faults
are still extremely hard to reveal at testing time, for instance
because they can be revealed only by selecting a specific input
out of a combinatorial number of cases.
This is the case of the OpenOffice bug report #126953,
which indicates that when changing the format of a paragraph
wrIECen with the Verdana font to italics bold, OpenOffice
incorrectly adds blank lines before each occurrence of the
brackets ’(’ and ’)’, and the text within the brackets disappears.
This failure can be triggered only with a specific combination
out of millions of input combinations: the use of Verdana font,
and the presence of brackets when changing fonts to italics
bold, out of the many combinations of font types, characters
and font properties.
Quantitative analysis: Figure 3 quantifies the impact of the
different field elements on faults, by indicating the amount
of faults affected by each type of field element. The causes
are not exclusive, since a same fault may involve multiple
field elements. In Figure 3, bar none reports the number of
bug reports that describe failures that do not involve any field
element.
Our analysis shows that interactions with the resources are
the main cause of field-intrinsic faults (49% of the cases).
Interactions with the operating systems are also a relevant
cause of field-intrinsic faults (20% of the cases). Network,
drivers & services, and plugins have been all observed as
causes of field-intrinsic faults at least once, but they are
collectively observed in a small proportion of the cases (10%
of the cases in total). In total, 78% of the field-intrinsic faults
interact with a field element.
Although the data reported in Figure 3 may be biased
Fig. 4. RQ3 - Failure Type
by the experimental setting, they already provide important
information to define a research road map in the study of
techniques to reveal and fix field-intrinsic faults.
RQ3: What kinds of field failures can be observed?
We analyzed the distribution of failure types, and inves-
tigated the issues related to detectability. Figure 4 plots the
distribution of the failure types presented in Table I.
Most failures (51 out of 83 failures corresponding to 61%
of the analyzed failures) are value failures, that is, executions
that produce incorrect results. The most frequent case of value
failures is the generation of invalid outputs, followed by the
generation of error messages and the production of values
out of domain (OOD in Figure 4). System failures are also
frequent (28 out of 83 failures corresponding to 34% of the
analyzed failures). They mostly lead to system crashes, and
only occasionally to either unstable behaviors or system halt.
Only a small set of the failures that we analyzed are due to the
timing aspect (4 out of 83 failures corresponding to 5% of the
analyzed failures). We observed few late timing and omission
failures, and no early timing failures.
The results indicate that the generation of incorrect values
(either invalid values, values out of domain or error messages)
and systems crashes are the main classes of field failures (they
represent 74 out of 83 failures corresponding to 89% of the
analyzed failures). These results, and in particular the low
frequency of timing failures, might depend on the domain that
we investigated (desktop applications extensible with plugins
and Web applications). We expect different frequencies of
failure types in other domains: In particular, we expect an
increasing frequency of timing failures in embedded systems,
where the synchronization among the software components
plays a relevant role.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of failures by detectability
according to the classes presented in Table II. A relatively
high portion of failures are detected because the failures are
either signaled by the application itself (14 out of 83 failures
corresponding to 17% of the analyzed failures) or unhandled
(25 out of 83 failures corresponding to 30% of the analyzed
failures) causing a system crash. Such failures can be easily
detected. On the contrary, silent failures (44 out of 83 failures
corresponding to 53% of the analyzed failures) are hard to
detect without some specific knowledge about the expected
behavior of the application in response to certain stimuli,
pointing to the well known oracle problem [28]. These results
Fig. 5. RQ3 - Detectability
Fig. 6. RQ4: Steps required to trigger a failure
suggest that testing strategies working in the field without
exploiting domain specific oracles could hardly reveal more
than half of the field-intrinsic faults.
The considered subjects do not include mechanisms to
automatically overcome from failures at runtime, and thus we
have not observed any occurrence of self-healed failure.
RQ4: How many steps are needed to reproduce a field failure?
As discussed in Section V, we computed the number of
user actions necessary to trigger the failures by considering
the operations that are described in the bug reports limiting to
the ones essential for reproducing the failure.
Figure 6 plots the distribution of the field-intrinsic faults
by the number of steps required to reproduce the failure. We
were not able to determine the number of steps required to
produce the failure in 13 out of the 83 analyzed failures (16%
cases corresponding to bar no info), while we determined the
number of steps required to reproduce the failure in 70 out
of the 83 analyzed failures (84%), and observed that a large
amount of failures can be reproduced with no more than three
steps (54 out of 70 reproducible failures corresponding to 77%
of the reproducible failures.)
These results provide useful information when designing
field-testing approaches, since they suggest that only few
actions are necessary to reproduce a failure once reached a
failure prone state, and indicate that field testing strategies
should focus more on detecting failure-prone states than on
generating long action sequences to reproduce the failures.
Threats to validity
We collected our experimental data from the bug reports
of desktop applications extensible with plugins (Eclipse and
OpenOffice) and Web applications (Nuxeo) by examining a
limited although reasonable amount of bug reports. The results
give early evidence of the nature of the failures that can be
experienced in plugins and Web applications, and need further
studies to be generalized to other kinds of applications and to
be quantitatively assessed.
We defined the classification schema, and analyzed the bug
reports manually. Two authors have independently analyzed
the bug reports, and all the authors have discussed the con-
flicting cases until reaching a consensus. Although the process
we followed should mitigate the risk of misinterpretation of the
cases, we cannot fully exclude clerical errors in our analysis.
The row data and the detailed material that we refer to in the
paper are publicly available for independent inspections and
further uses.
The bug reports that we examined might be inaccurate
some times. They may for example include partial informa-
tion about the failures. Although we cannot fully eliminate
this potential issue, we believe that possibly incomplete bug
reports considered in the experiments may have reduced the
number of field-intrinsic faults that we identified, thus only
pessimistically affecting the results. In particular, the lack of
information about a failure may have increased the chance of
a fault to be erroneously classified as irreproducible execution
condition, while the unknown conditions about the application
or the environment may have reduced the amount of faults
classified as combinatorial explosion faults. We assume that
our results that indicate a density of 70% of field-intrinsic
faults among the analyzed bug reports is a conservative under
approximation of the field-intrinsic faults that are present in
the examined applications.
VII. FINDINGS
The experimental data that we collected to answer the
research questions lead to some interesting findings:
Most of the failures that can be observed in the field are
caused by field-intrinsic faults: Our experimental data indicate
that about 70% of the field failures that we analyzed are caused
by field-intrinsic faults, that is, are caused by faults that might
be hardly revealed in house. These faults are caused by four
challenges: combinatorial explosion, unknown environment or
application condition, and situations impossible to reproduce.
This result calls for approaches that can deal with these classes
of failures in the field.
Combinatorial explosion is a relevant cause of undetected
field-intrinsic faults: Combinatorial explosions are notably
hard to address in testing and analysis techniques. Our ex-
perimental investigation indicates that, despite numerous tech-
niques developed to tackle the problem of generating test cases
that adequately cover interactions of parameters in a software
application [29], [30], combinatorial explosion still plays a
prominent role in preventing the detection of field-intrinsic
faults. Differently from other contexts, in the case of field-
intrinsic faults, the source of combinatorial explosion is not
the user input (only 18% of the failures are caused by specific
combinations of inputs) but the status of the field elements.
The interaction with the environment is almost always a
relevant factor in field-intrinsic faults: The vast majority of
the field-intrinsic faults (78% in our study) requires some
forms of interactions with the environment to be activated.
Resources and operating systems are the most relevant field
elements involved in field-failures, but also drivers, plugins
and the network are often important. This result indicates
that techniques to reveal field-intrinsic faults must take into
consideration the production environment in which the system
is executed.
Value and system field-faults are more frequent than timing
field-faults: The ability to analyze the output produced by a
system, including the ability to detect crashes, is sufficient to
detect most of the field-intrinsic failures, with a rate of timing
field failures as low as 5% of the cases.
The oracle problem affects about half of the field-intrinsic
faults: Our experimental analysis indicates that 43% of the
failures can be detected by intercepting unhandled events, for
example system crashes, and error messages. Domain specific
oracles are necessary to address the remaining 57% of the
cases. This calls for techniques and methods to derive strong
automatic oracles for field testing.
Field failures can be commonly revealed with short se-
quences of actions: Our experimental analysis provides ev-
idence that few steps (three or fewer actions in 77% of
the cases) are usually needed to make the SIF fail from a
failure-prone state. This suggests that detecting states that offer
opportunities for running test and analysis routines might be
more important than studying techniques for generating tests
composed of long sequences of actions.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Our study provides an initial characterization of the factors
that might cause field failures. The most closely related work
includes empirical studies about software faults and techniques
to address the problem of testing applications in the field. We
discuss both categories below.
Empirical Studies Most of the studies on software faults
and failures focus on the distribution of faults and failures
across the components of a system [31]–[35]. These and our
studies address different goals, but share some hypotheses and
observations: they all (i) distinguish between pre-release and
post-released faults, that is, faults detected during and after
development, respectively, (ii) provide evidence that often a
small subset of the components of a system contains most
of the post-release faults, and (iii) indicate that the size of a
component is not a good predictor of the post-release fault
density [31]–[34].
The results reported in existing studies might be exploited
to improve the design of techniques for predicting failures and
locating faults in the field, for example Wu et al. [36] report a
direct dependency between the quality of the testing process
and the density of pre- and post-release faults in the source
files. However they do not contribute in the identification of
the factors that may cause and motivate the presence of field
failures.
Both Hamill et al. [11] and Fan et al. [8] proposed tax-
onomies of field-faults, with a high-coarse granularity and
a focus on nuclear applications, respectively. Hamill et al.
identify a set of field-fault categories at a granularity level
that is much higher than ours and provide limited support for
analyzing the characteristics of field failures in details. Hamil
et al. conclude that coding faults are the major cause of field
failures, but do not further analyze the characteristic of the
faults, such as the nature of the triggers of the failures, as
done in this paper, where we discuss the relation between field
failures and the interactions with external resources.
Fan et al. show that in the nuclear industry software field
failures mostly depend on design choices [8]. Although the
paper does not investigate why these faults have not been
revealed at an earlier stage of development, some of the
failure causes reported in the paper are consistent with the
results that we obtained. For example, the presence of failures
caused by incorrect assumptions and unexpected execution
conditions are consistent with the failures that we reported
under the unknown environment or application conditions
categories. The consistency with the results reported by our
study increases the confidence on the validity of the results
reported in this paper.
Grottke et al. [37] and Cotroneo et al. [38] study Bohrbugs
and Mandelbugs in safety critical applications and open-source
software, respectively. Both studies focused on variations of
amount of Bohrbugs and Mandelbugs during the application
life cycle and on their impact on the time to fix a bug. Both
studies reveal some dependency of Mandelbugs from interac-
tion of the software with field elements. Our results confirm
that dependencies of some bugs from environment interactions
persist also after deployment. Lutz et al. [39] classify safety-
critical anomalies using Orthogonal Defect Classification, fo-
cusing on how to improve safety-critical software development
process. Our study identifies anomaly types and targets fixes
after deployment.
Testing In the Field Field testing techniques are techniques
that aim to reveal faults that escape in house testing before
causing the system to fail in the field. Field testing has been
addressed quite recently with In Vivo Testing [3], Skoll [40]
and in the context of Web services [4], [5], [41].
In Vivo testing is a technique for identifying faults that are
triggered only in specific program states [3]. The approach
targets Java classes and consists of executing a predefined set
of test cases while the software is running in the field. Test
cases are executed within a sandboxed replica of the system,
with a parametric frequency and at randomly selected time.
In Vivo testing can detect faults that can be triggered with a
predefined set of inputs provided by the software developers,
but cannot detect faults that are triggered with inputs that have
not been identified at testing time. Moreover, the strategy does
not take into account the factors that demonstrate to play a
key role in field failures according to our study, such as the
interaction with the field.
Skoll aims to identify the faults that have not been detected
at testing time because of the combinatorial explosion of the
configuration options and the characteristics of the environ-
ment [40]. Skoll distributes testing tasks across machines of
volunteering end-users to extensively explore and test the con-
figuration space. Like in-vivo testing, Skoll does not generate
test cases nor reuses runtime data to enhance testing activities.
Thus, it cannot detect faults that are revealed by inputs not
considered by the software engineers who implemented the
test cases deployed in the field.
In the context of Web-service composition, online testing is
used to trigger predefined self-adaptation strategies when Web
services do not behave as expected, for example because the
service specification has been updated or because the service
itself is down [4], [5], [41]. These approaches target a specific
class of software systems, and rely on strategies and inputs
predefined by the software engineers.
The results reported in this paper call for novel testing and
analysis techniques that can be executed in the field to reveal
field-intrinsic faults. These techniques must have the ability
to test situations that cannot be foreseen at development time
and must face the challenge of dealing with field elements,
such as local resources and services, without interfering with
the user activity.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper reports the results of an empirical study about
the characteristics of field failures, that is, failures observed in
production environments. In details, we introduce the concept
field-intrinsic faults as faults inherently hard to detect in-house
and more effectively detectable in the field. Field-intrinsic
faults are a relevant subset of the more general category of
field faults that characterize faults in the field regardless of why
they escaped in-house testing. We report our findings about
the high frequency of field-intrinsic faults in the analyzed bug
reports (field-intrinsic faults represent 70% of the analyzed
field faults), obtaining initial evidence that there is a relevant
amount of faults that cannot be effectively addressed in-house
and should be addressed directly in the field. We qualitatively
analyze the cases, and identify four main reasons for the
presence of field-intrinsic faults: cases impossible to replicate
in-house, combinatorial explosion of the cases that should be
tested, unknown application or environment conditions.
We investigate the characteristics of these faults to deter-
mine the elements that may make them intrinsically hard
to detect. We identify the need to reason on the state of
the application and the need to interpret the outputs of the
application as two key features of techniques designed to
reveal these faults.
We are currently continuing the experimental evaluation of
reports extracted from the bug repositories of applications in
the same domain, to assess the quantitative data reported in
this paper, and in different domains, to study the impact of
the domains on field failures. reveal field-intrinsic faults.
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